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Dowry is a common custom observed in South Asian countries. It has been a target of an 
opposition movement because it is assumed to be a root cause of women’s mistreatment, for 
example, in the form of sex-selective abortion, girls’ malnutrition, female infanticide, and 
domestic homicide called “dowry murder.” Despite its alleged evil consequences and the legal 
ban or restrictions on it, the custom has been extended, and recently, the dowry amount seems to 
be increasing. However, there is little empirical evidence of dowry’s effects. This study 
empirically investigates the effects of dowry on women’s status in rural Pakistan. We conducted 
a unique survey in rural Punjab, Pakistan, to explore the marriage practices there and to answer 
the research question. Results show that a higher dowry amount enhances women’s status in the 
marital household. This implies that an outright ban on dowries does not necessarily improve 
women’s welfare at this time.  
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1. Introduction 
Dowry, broadly defined as the transfer of wealth by the bride’s parents at the time of 
marriage,1 is often considered the root cause of unequal treatment of girls within the family, 
represented by sex-selective abortion, female infanticide, malnutrition of girls, under-education 
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1 Although the definition of dowry is controversial, there is no objection about the part that it is the 
transfer of wealth by the bride’s parents at the time of marriage (Kishwar 1988; Billig 1992; Srinivas 
1994; Zhang and Chan 1999). 
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of girls, and so on. The notable phenomenon of “missing women,” referring to the unnaturally 
low female-to-male ratios in South Asia, can be associated with the practice of dowry (Sen 
1990; Croll 2000; Anderson and Ray 2010). Advertisements for sex-selective abortion read 
“Better Rs. 500 now than Rs. 500,000 later (in dowry).” Especially in India, dowry is 
sensationally reported by the media, and academics indicate it to be a cause of domestic 
violence and homicide called “dowry murder” (Stone and James 1995; Rudd 2001; Bloch and 
Rao 2002; Sekhri and Storegard 2014). On the basis of the belief that dowry is an evil custom, 
the anti-dowry movement began at the end of the 1970s, led by female activists and NGOs. The 
stance on dowry issues has also become politically important.2 Dowry has been labeled an 
anti-social practice and is banned or restricted by law.3 Nevertheless, no legal, political, or 
social action seems effective in discouraging the practice of dowry; in fact, it seems recently to 
have intensified and extended.  
Although dowry is claimed to be an abominable practice, especially in India, its real effects 
are not well known. There are a massive amount of case studies on dowry; however, many seem 
little more than a set of anecdotes and narratives, often focusing on worst cases, such as dowry 
murder.4 Some argue that most deaths recorded as dowry murder in India were unrelated to 
dowry (Kishwar 1988, 1989; Narayan 1997; Leslie 1998; Oldenburg 2002).5 Contrary to 
general belief, the ban’s consistent ineffectiveness implies that people have a sound rationale for 
practicing dowry. Dowry may enhance women’s status in the given context where women’s 
property rights and security are not sufficiently guaranteed in practice. Indeed, dowry may 
exemplify seemingly gender-discriminatory practices that actually function as an informal 
mechanism protecting women’s rights under a weak legal system.6 If dowry enhances women’s 
welfare in the given context, banning dowry may result in unexpected and undesired 
consequences such as reducing women’s welfare and disempowering them. Therefore, the 
current study aims at empirically investigating the effect of dowry on women’s welfare in the 
marital household.  
                                                        
2 For example, the left-wing parties attach political stigma to marriage with dowry (Palriwala 2009). 
3 The Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 and its amendments in India; the Dowry Prohibition Act of 
1980 and its amendments in Bangladesh; the Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act of 1976, and 
the Marriages (Prohibition of Wasteful Expenses) Act of 1997 in Pakistan. 
4 One empirical study on dowry murder exists (Sekhri and Storegard 2014); however, it cannot deny 
the possibility that reported dowry murders include all kinds of domestic homicide. 
5 These sociological and anthropological studies argue that any kind of domestic homicide might be 
recorded simply as dowry murder on the basis of the fact that no data exist on general murder cases 
from domestic violence, while dowry murder is surprisingly visible, with tabulated data assembled 
by the National Crimes Bureau of the Government of India. 
6 Watta satta (literally “give–take,” bride exchange) is an example of such an informal mechanism 
(Jacoby and Mansuri 2010). 
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The most important reason for a dearth of rigorous evidence may be scarce or inadequate 
data needed to conduct empirical analysis. Dowry is an illegal social practice in India and 
Bangladesh; therefore, it is often reported that people are unwilling to reveal the correct dowry 
amount. Besides, dowry usually consists of jewelry, clothing, furniture, household items, 
livestock, cash, and so on; thus, assessing dowry value at the time of marriage becomes even 
more difficult (Jejeebhoy 2000). For the exclusive purpose of examining dowry’s effect on 
women’s status, we have conducted a household survey in rural Punjab, Pakistan. We 
meticulously designed the survey questionnaire to obtain correct information on every single 
item of dowry.  
The studies most closely related to ours are Zhang and Chan (1999) and Brown (2009), 
both showing that dowries have positive impacts on several measures of women’s welfare in 
East Asia. Empirical studies being scarce as a whole, to our knowledge, only one empirical 
study concerning dowry payments in Pakistan has been conducted to date (Anderson 2000 
2004). Dowry’s effect on women’s welfare is an empirical question because its effects can be 
diverse, depending on the context. Jejeebhoy’s (2000) study shows that a larger size of dowries 
positively affects women’s decision-making power in the northern part of India, but not in south 
India. Dowry’s heterogenous effects may possibly be related to women’s property rights, which 
are relatively protected in southern India than in the north. If dowry compensates for 
institutional failure to protect women’s property rights, dowry’s effect on women’s welfare in 
rural Pakistan, where they are virtually not protected, may be positive.  
Another obstacle in conducting an empirical study on dowry is the potential endogeneity 
problem. In particular, the unobserved characteristics of the bride’s parents may affect not only 
how the bride is treated in the marital household but also the amount of dowry. Better treatment 
of women in the marital household may not be due to a higher amount of dowry, but because of 
unobserved characteristics of the bride’s parents such as their greater awareness of women’s 
rights, which may also simultaneously increase the dowry amount. Among a limited number of 
empirical studies on dowry, only a few have paid attention to the endogeneity problem,7 for 
instance, Zhang and Chan (1999) and Brown (2009) use instrumental variables to deal with the 
endogeneity of dowry in their studies. Because any instrumental variables for dowries involve 
difficulty in convincingly satisfying the exclusion restriction on their own, in the current study, 
two methods are used to deal with the endogeneity problem. The first method is to include a 
rich set of observed characteristics concerning the marriage. We then follow Altonji et al. 
(2005) to demonstrate how large the effects of unobservables are in order to completely 
                                                        
7 For example, neither Jejeebhoy (2000) nor Behrman et al. (1999) take endogeneity into account.  
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eliminate the effects of dowry on women’s status. 8  The second method is to construct 
instrumental variables for the dowry amount. We recognize non-existence of instruments that 
randomly assign dowry amount, but we do our best to assign instrumental variables that do not 
include unobserved household characteristics by construction.  
In a broader perspective, the current study is related to the literature on the relationship 
between empowerment and economic development (e.g., World Bank 2011; Duflo 2010). In 
general, the positive association between women’s empowerment and economic development is 
observed. In South Asian countries, however, economic development does not necessarily 
accompany women’s equal treatment. For example, the skewed male-female ratio seems rather 
exacerbated recently (Croll 2000). Dowry practice, often a symbol of women’s 
disempowerment, is disappearing with the spread of modernization (Anderson 2003). The only 
exception is South Asia where the practice not only continues but is also expanding. In a context 
where women’s legal protection is underdeveloped, interpreting dowry as a symbol of women’s 
disempowerment may be misleading. Rather in such a context, dowry may empower women. 
We cannot find any negative effects of dowry on women’s status in the marital household. 
Rather, empirical analysis reveals that in rural Punjab, Pakistan, higher dowry amounts are 
associated with increased status of women in the marital family. Our findings provide a 
foundation for policy debate concerning the custom of dowry in Pakistan, where dowry is not 
yet legally banned and is a hot policy topic because of its alleged negative consequences. In a 
society where women do not inherit parental land in practice, dowry might be the only asset that 
women can take into marriage and the only source of protection for them after marriage. 
Because dowry, in fact, increases women’s welfare at this moment, policies should not 
universally ban the practice of dowry without any real, pragmatic improvement of women’s 
inheritance rights.  
The remainder of this paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 overviews related research 
and existing data. Section 3 describes our unique household survey and the dataset. Section 4 
presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2. Overview of related research and existing data 
The current paper is academically motivated by the fact that there is little empirical 
evidence while theoretical research has been active. The biggest obstacle to conduct empirical 
studies on dowry is the lack or inadequacy of data. In this section, we provide an overview of 
related research on dowry as well as the problems of existing data on dowry.  
                                                        





2.1 Literature on dowry 
Although empirical evidence is scarce, economists have actively conducted theoretical 
studies on dowry (Becker 1991; Botticini and Siow 2003; Boserup 2007; Anderson 2003; 2007). 
The two main interpretations of dowry are (1) the price determined in the marriage market (the 
price model), and (2) the pre-mortem inheritance (the bequest model). The definition of dowry 
has been an object of discussions that aim to interpret the nature of dowry. Following the price 
hypothesis, dowry is often defined as a transfer in cash or kind or both from the bride’s parents 
to the groom and his parents at the time of marriage, which is expected or even demanded by 
the groom and his family. However, following the bequest hypothesis, dowry is rather property 
taken by the bride to her new home or given to her during the marriage rituals by her parents. 
These two interpretations of dowry are often considered as mutually exclusive (see Zhang 
and Chan 1999; Anderson 2003; Arunachalam and Logan 2015), and existing studies focus on 
the question of whether dowry is a price or a bequest. The reason is that the two hypotheses are 
believed to lead to opposite policy implications. If dowry is a pre-mortem bequest voluntarily 
offered by the bride’s parents, laws prohibiting dowry practice might not be necessary. If dowry 
is a price that can be driven up depending on the marriage market, it potentially decreases girls’ 
chance of survival and thus may be better prohibited by law.  
Although these two models are often considered mutually exclusive, typical empirical 
studies construct an estimation model to test independently either the price or the bequest 
model; thus, such studies cannot reject one over the other even if they claim to do so. Those 
testing the price model typically regress the amount of dowry on the bride’s and the groom’s 
characteristics (Behrman et al. 1995; Deolalikar and Rao 1998; Behrman et al. 1999; Mbiti 
2008), and most of them cannot find any strong evidence supporting the price model. Those 
testing the bequest model usually regress women’s welfare measures on the amount of dowry 
(Zhang and Chan 1999; Brown 2009). They claim that the finding that dowry enhances 
women’s welfare supports the bequest model; however, the finding does not necessarily reject 
the price model because women’s welfare could increase with a higher dowry amount under the 
price model. Possibly, dowry is determined in the marriage market, but the bride’s parents may 
voluntarily pay a higher amount so that the groom and his parents will treat their daughter better 
after marriage. This study is specifically interested in whether dowry enhances women’s welfare 
in the marital household under present circumstances. 
The current study is not the first to empirically investigate dowry’s effect on women’s 
welfare and empowerment. Zhang and Chan (1999) originally incorporate assets brought into 
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marriage into the Nash model of household bargaining (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and 
Horney 1981; McElroy 1990; Lundberg and Pollak 1993). With the assumption that assets 
brought into the marital family increase one’s threat point,9 the theoretical implication of the 
model is that dowries, or any asset brought into marriage, have positive effects on one’s private 
consumption in the marital family.10 Zhang and Chan (1999) and Brown (2000) use East Asian 
datasets and show that dowries have positive effects on several measures of women’s welfare. 
Although the endogeneity of dowry amount is not taken into account, Jejeebhoy (2000) 
demonstrates that the size of dowries positively affects women’s decision-making power in 
north India, but this is not the case in the south. Bloch and Rao (2002) and Srinivasan and Bedi 
(2007), both using data from a few specific Indian villages, indicate that women with higher 
dowry amounts are less likely to suffer domestic violence from their husbands, while Suran et al. 
(2004) show a completely opposite effect from data in rural Bangladesh. In sum, the effect of 
dowry on women’s welfare is an empirical question because it likely varies depending on the 
social context.  
 
2.2 Problems of existing data 
Because dowry is legally banned in India and Bangladesh, people usually hesitate to 
provide the correct amount of dowry. The typical question on dowry in the Indian dataset asks 
about community-based dowry. For example, the India Human Development Survey asks 
“Generally in your community for a family like yours, what are the kind of things that are given 
as gifts at the time of the daughter’s marriage?” Community-based dowry is not necessarily the 
same as individual dowry, which is actually paid by the bride’s parents at the time of marriage. 
Alternatively, the question regarding dowry has only a binary answer, i.e., whether a positive 
amount of dowry is paid (e.g., Survey on the Status of Women and Fertility both in India and 
Pakistan). The binary answer, of course, does not provide much additional information. The 
norm of whether a positive dowry amount is provided corresponds to, and is largely explained 
by ethnic, religious, and caste background in South Asia. 
Because dowry is not legally banned in Pakistan, the amount personally paid by the female 
respondent’s parents can be asked without reservation in a Pakistani dataset such as the Pakistan 
                                                        
9 A threat point can be determined by extra-household environmental parameters such as sex ratio in 
the marriage market and divorce laws, as well as non-cooperative equilibrium within marriage 
(Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981; Lundberg and Pollak 1993).  
10 Although Zhang and Chan (1999) call the derived theoretical implication “bequest model,” the 
term might be misleading. Dowry is likely to reflect parental assets, but it may not necessarily be 
equally divided between sisters—as is often the case with bequest. Furthermore, assets brought into 
marriage might be far less than the amount inherited by brothers. Thus, the term “trousseau” might 
more properly describe assets brought into marriage by the bride. 
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Rural Household Survey. Although Pakistani interviewees may not intentionally conceal true 
information on dowry, the survey may likely entail recall errors because they must 
retrospectively provide the dowry amount paid by their parents several years ago. Figure 1 plots 
the predicted amount of real dowry measured in Pakistani Rupees in 2004 onto years of 
marriage using the Pakistan Rural Household Survey. Because the consensus is that the real 
amount of dowry is increasing, or is at least in a non-declining trend, the figure implies the 
general tendency of recall errors. In other words, the longer the gap between the interviewees’ 
marriage and the recall time, the more likely they overestimate the dowry amount.  
 
3. Data 
To the best of our knowledge, data collected in this study is the first to consider explicitly a 
general tendency to overestimate the amount that was paid a long time ago. Similar to the 
characteristics of previously collected data, ours are also retrospective; however, based on this 
tendency, we particularly adopted certain efforts to minimize survey recall errors. For example, 
we asked both the community-based dowry amount (non-retrospective) and the personal dowry 
amount paid at the time of the respondent’s marriage (retrospective). Since Pakistani dowry 
consists of gold/jewelry, clothing, furniture, kitchen items, and so on, we queried dowry 
amounts by item. If we sensed a respondent’s overestimation of the dowry amount, especially in 
case of a marriage that took place a long time ago, because dowry is displayed, we could and 
did check the amount with those who attended the ceremony. Consequently, our data on 
predicted real amounts of dowry (Figure 2) do not show any decreasing trend, in contrast with 
Figure 1.  
 
3.1 Survey 
When conducting our survey between June and October 2013, we intended to capture the 
heterogeneous aspects of the Punjab province in Pakistan so that the survey represents the 
entirety of Punjab. First, we divided Punjab (36 districts) into five regions and selected one 
district from each region: Pothohar (or North), Central, East, West, and South Punjab. These 
five regions differ in terms of climate, culture including marriage/inheritance practice, and 
socioeconomic conditions. We randomly selected one district from each region, namely, 
Rawalpindi, Mandi Bahauddin, Narowal, Muzaffargarh, and Bahawalnagar (see Figure 3). We 
used the district census for 1998–1999, the latest census available in Pakistan, to randomly 
select six villages in rural areas in each of the five districts. We restricted sampling villages to 
those with population of at least 1,000 at the time of the census. In each village, we selected 22 
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households, following a stratified random sampling methodology. First, with assistance from 
the village chief, we made a profile of the village to pursue stratified random sampling. The 
strata are kammees11 (i.e., traditional service caste, with annual income ≤ PKR 200,000, > 
PKR 200,000) and zamindars (i.e., landowning farmers with land < 5 acres, 5–12.5 acres, >12.5 
acres). Second, we made a population of our survey and categorized it into each stratum. The 
eligible households of our survey are defined as those with an economically active husband and 
wife aged 15–65. Finally, we performed a stratified random sampling so that the percentage of 
each stratum of our sample corresponds to the percentage of each stratum of the village 
population (= households). 
The questionnaire was carefully designed to comprehensively understand marriage 
practices in rural Punjab, Pakistan. The questionnaire consists of two parts, the first with 
questions to the husband and the second with questions to his wife. Because the second part 
contains sensitive questions to assess the wife’s status in the marital household, we attempted to 
maintain the wife’s privacy as much as possible, for example, by requesting a separate interview 
room so that the wife could answer without feeling any pressure from her husband. 
 
3.2 Marriage practices 
The summary statistics of husband and wife and their marriage characteristics are presented 
in Table 1. The average age of husbands is 40.6 years. Husbands, on average, completed 
primary education (5 years), and 56 percent of them are literate. The average age of wives is 
35.8 years. Wives, on average, did not complete primary education, and only 30 percent of them 
are literate. The literacy rates seem much lower than official statistics on adult (15 years and 
older) literacy in rural Punjab, provided by the Pakistan Social and Living Standard 
Measurement Survey 2012–2013, which reports 63 percent and 40 percent for males and 
females, respectively. Official statistics are known to overestimate educational achievement, 
while we define literacy strictly: we asked respondents to write one sentence and defined them 
as literate if they could read and write at least a sentence; we did not consider them literate if 
they could read only the Qur’an. Kammee households account for 27 percent of total households 
surveyed. The average size of agricultural land per household is 3.24 acres, with almost 40 
                                                        
11 Kammees are of the traditional service caste in village society in Pakistan. They are landless and 
have provided various services to landowning farmers (zamindars), as carpenters (tarkhan), barbers 
(nai), blacksmiths (lohar), tailors (darzi), and so on. Muslims deny the caste system, but the 
hierarchical relationship does exist between zamindars and kammees, called the Seyp system 
(Hirashima 1977). Kammees are conceptually different from caste; however, effectively indicate 
social class, and thus, we call them caste in this study for descriptive purposes. 
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percent of households being landless.12 For almost 40 percent of wives, the village of birth is 
the same as that of their husbands, 66 percent of them are married to their cousins, and 17 
percent are married in watta satta (bride exchange, or literally, “give–take”).13 All of these are 
unique features of marriage in Punjab, Pakistan. By contrast, the northwest part of India, 
including Indian Punjab, has been traditionally known for hypergamy, in which wives are 
married to husbands of higher status. Hypergamy contrasts with endogamy and cousin marriage. 
Watta satta is also excluded from hypergamy because two families arranging watta satta cannot 
technically observe hypergamy at the same time, and they are most likely to be from the same 
social class and economic condition.  
The first part of the questionnaire asks the husbands about their marriage practices, 
including the amount of dowry. Because dowry is well known to be consisting of various items 
that enable a young couple to start their own life immediately after marriage, we asked about 
each item’s value within the dowry. The actual question is “Generally, in your community, for a 
family like yours, what is the approximate value of each item given as dowry at the time of the 
daughter’s marriage?” We explicitly asked about dowry as observed in their community because 
we are interested in the practice of dowry itself, as well as in the personal amount of dowry their 
parents paid. When asked about dowry in their community, their answer is likely to convey 
precise information about dowry practice. They might answer with how much they pay for each 
item if they are in the process of providing a dowry to their daughter. In either case, the answer 
is likely to provide more precise measures on the itemized value of dowry. Presumably, 
remembering every single item of their personal dowries from several years ago would be 
difficult. The second part of the questionnaire asks the wives about their personal dowries, i.e., 
“How much dowry did your parents provide at the time of your marriage?” These responses are 
used in the empirical analysis. Answers by husbands about community-based dowry amounts 
are used to check the wives’ answers about their personal dowries.  
Figure 4 shows the itemized average value of dowry generally provided by a daughter’s 
parents at the time of her marriage. Contrary to our expectation, the amount of cash is not very 
large, and cash included in a dowry, especially cash to the groom, seems a token payment with 
the average negligible amount being PKR 3,759.14 The average value of gold/jewelry offered to 
the bride by her parents is the largest among all items, PKR 76,651. Both cash and gold/jewelry 
are offered by approximately 90 percent of brides’ parents. Also, somewhat to our surprise, the 
                                                        
12 “Landless” means those without agricultural land. Most of the respondents own residential land.  
13 Watta satta usually involves a joint marriage in which a brother and a sister of one family marry a 
sister and a brother of another family. The composition of groom and bride from one family is not 
necessarily a brother–sister pair, but sometimes an uncle–niece pair. 
14 On average, USD 1 = PKR 102.84 between June and October 2013.  
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average value of electronics, furniture, and kitchenware offered to the bride by her parents is 
large, and these items are offered by an even higher percent of the brides’ parents (95 to 100 
percent). Although the average value of each item is less than that of gold/jewelry, the average 
value of furniture, electronics, and kitchenware combined amounts to PKR 136,389—much 
greater than that of gold/jewelry. Although we should carefully interpret gold/jewelry offered to 
the bride by her parents as gifts to the bride because such items can easily be converted into 
cash and might be taken by the groom and his parents, items such as furniture, electronics, and 
kitchenware can be safely interpreted as gifts to the bride by her parents. In India, reportedly, 
the groom’s parents often ask the bride’s parents for dowry to prepare future dowries for their 
daughters (circulating dowry). However, in rural Pakistani Punjab, the largest share of dowry 
being furniture/electronics/kitchenware makes it difficult to support the hypothesis of 
circulating dowry. Looking at items’ value in detail, dowry seems, in fact, trousseau that is 
voluntarily offered by the bride’s parents to their daughter at the time of her marriage and is at 
her disposal in the marital household.  
Although dowry expense incurred by the bride’s parents is notoriously known, and in fact, 
is the single greatest expense in marriage, the expenses incurred by the groom’s parents are far 
from negligible. Figure 5 shows a comparison between the magnitude of marriage expenses 
incurred by both sides. In addition to the ceremony expense,15 the groom’s side also incurs the 
cost of gifts to the bride called bari, an indispensable part of the ceremony. Bari typically 
consists of jewelry and clothing offered to the bride and her female relatives, and it can be 
considered a customary bride price. These two major expenses in marriage incurred by the 
groom’s side, i.e., the ceremony expense and bari, together surpass the amount of dowry 
incurred by the bride’s side. Apparently, the expense of marriage in Pakistani Punjab is not 
disproportionally borne by the bride’s parents.  
Also, notably, dowry is sometimes partially incurred by the groom’s side. We observed that 
in some communities, the groom’s side customarily bears 50–60 percent of the dowry expense. 
Although households bearing half the expense of dowry account for only 7 percent of the 
sample, this custom is far from negligible because it does not fit into either the price hypothesis 
or the bequest hypothesis. Under the price model, dowry payment should be one-sided, by the 
side gaining from marriage or by the side oversupplied in the marriage market (Zhang and Chan 
1999). Under the bequest model, dowry should be paid entirely by the bride’s parents (Botticini 
                                                        
15 In the survey, we asked for itemized average expenses of a marriage ceremony, generally paid by 
both the groom’s and bride’s parents. On average, the groom’s parents incur more ceremonial 
expenses for each item. In particular, the groom’s parents usually pay a substantial amount for the 
procession ceremony (baraat) and feast (walima). 
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and Siow 2003). The fact that the groom’s side bears approximately half the expense of dowry 
can be consistent with the idea that dowry is a resource to help the new couple start their marital 
life. It also fits into the interpretation of dowry as trousseau, implied by Figure 4. 
The amount of Islamic bride price, called mehr,16 whether its payment is immediate 
(moajel) or deferred (non-moajel), supports the view that bride price is nowadays a mere token 
payment (Figure 5). The major reason for mehr becoming merely symbolic in establishing a 
marriage in Pakistani Punjab, seems to be the shame felt about the perception of mehr, which 
reminds people of the sale of a daughter by a father to a husband (Eglar 1960; Oldenburg 2002); 
this is confirmed by our qualitative interviews. On average, a negligible amount is reported for 
moajel, and only 17 percent of those interviewed answer that they generally specify non-moajel 
in the marriage contract. We cannot find any strong correlation between the practice of writing 
any non-moajel into the marriage contract and household status (whether zamindars or 
kammees) or household wealth (quality of living and size of land ownership). We observe some 
negative correlation between the practice of writing non-moajel and the Punjabi ethnicity.  
We asked wives why the real amount of dowry differed among siblings (Figure 6, panels 
(a) and (b)).17 We allowed multiple answers by the respondents, and thus, the number of 
observations is the total number of reasons given by the respondents. Panel (a) is the answers 
when the respondent’s parents were on the side of payment while panel (b) is the answers when 
her in-laws were on the side of payment. Excluding “emotional attachment” to one daughter, 
and “upward trend” of dowry, which are less meaningful answers in our study, dowry offered to 
the bride by her parents (panel (a)) tends to be higher when (1) the groom’s quality is better 
(higher education, higher earning ability), (2) the groom’s family’s status/economic condition is 
better, (3) the bride’s parents are in better financial condition (compared to the groom’s family 
and/or to the time of their other daughters’ marriages), and (4) the marriage is arranged out of 
biradari (literally “brotherhood,” a group of male kin). Reasons for a difference in the dowry 
amount received by the groom (panel (b)) are consistent with those for the bride. As 
determinants of the dowry amount, these answers seem to reinforce the importance of the 
groom’s quality and the bride’s parents’ financial capacity to pay. The idea that a higher quality 
of groom increases the dowry amount is better explained by the price model, while the idea that 
the financial capacity of the bride’s parents increases the dowry amount is close to the bequest 
                                                        
16 Mehr is required to conclude the marriage, which is a contract for Muslims. Mehr consists of two 
parts: one is moajel, the immediate transfer at the time of marriage from the groom’s to the bride’s 
side; the other is non-moajel, a deferred transfer promised for payment at the time of divorce. 
17 We also asked husbands about any differences of future dowries they expect to pay or receive at 




model. Apparently, the two major hypotheses about dowry, the price and the bequest 
hypotheses, are not exclusive. To lead to effective policy implication aimed at improving 
women’s welfare in Pakistan (and South Asia), examining the effects of dowry on women’s 
welfare could be more useful rather than discussing the hypothesis that is true to the nature of 
dowry. 
 
3.3 Measure of women’s status 
The measures of women’s status/empowerment are all answered by wives and summarized 
in Figure 7. The first measure is women’s decision-making power; we asked wives who has the 
most say in decision making on (1) what to cook on a daily basis, (2) whether to buy an 
expensive item such as a television or refrigerator, (3) how many children to have, (4) what to 
do if a child falls sick, and (5) whom the children should marry. We construct an indicator 
variable for women’s decision making that equals one if the wife has the most say in deciding 
each item and zero otherwise. The summary of the five indicator variables is presented in Panel 
(a) of Figure 7. As expected, the majority of wives, 75 percent and 63 percent, have the most 
say on what to cook and what to do when a child falls sick, respectively. In contrast, only a 
small fraction of wives can decide on major household expenses, fertility, and children’s 
marriages.  
The second measure is women’s autonomy; we asked the wife whether she has to ask 
permission of her husband to go to (1) the local health center, (2) the home of relatives/friends 
in the village, and (3) the neighborhood shop. We construct an indicator variable for women’s 
autonomy that equals one if the wife has to ask permission of her husband and zero otherwise. 
Panel (b) of Figure 7 summarizes these three indicator variables. Wives in Pakistani Punjab 
seem, on average, to have autonomy. Approximately 70 percent of wives do not have to ask 
permission of their husbands to go to the local health center, and approximately 75 percent of 
wives can visit their relatives/friends and a neighborhood shop without asking permission. The 
reason they have modest autonomy could partially be due to the prevalence of village endogamy, 
implying that the village people are relatives, and the practice of purdah18 is relatively relaxed 
within the village.  
The third measure concerns the women’s level of son preference. We construct two 
indicator variables for son preference. One indicator variable takes the value one if the wife’s 
ideal number of boys is greater than her ideal number of girls and zero otherwise. Another 
indicator variable takes the value one if the wife believes that boys should be more educated 
                                                        
18 Purdah literally means “curtain” in Urdu. Purdah is the practice of gender segregation and the 
seclusion of women in public, observed in South Asian countries. 
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than girls and zero otherwise. These are summarized in Panel (c) of Figure 7.  
The last measure is women’s work time. We report their work time separately with and 
without payment in Panel (d) of Figure 7. Women’s average work time without payment is 5.4 
hours per day. Work without payment includes time for cooking, sewing, cleaning, laundry, 
childcare, and farming/livestock care. Women’s average work time with payment is only 0.43 
hours per day. This is because a majority of women, approximately 80 percent, do not work for 
pay. Their average work time with payment conditional on that they work for pay is 2.1 hours 
per day. This might still seem a short time at first glance; however, this is the average for the 
entire year, and notably, women working as agricultural labor work only seasonally, 
approximately 3 to 4 months. 
 
 
4. Estimation  
4.1 The estimation model  
We are interested in the effects of the amount of dowry on women’s status in the marital 
household, which is represented by  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝟑′ 𝑿𝒊𝒊 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖 , (1) 
 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑖 (𝐵𝑖𝑖) is the amount of dowry of the wife, personally paid by her parents (bari or 
bride price, personally offered to the wife by her in-laws) in household 𝑖 in village 𝑗 measured 
in 2013 Pakistani Rupees. 𝑿𝒊𝒊 is a set of covariates of household 𝑖, namely the wife’s age at 
marriage, the wife and her husband’s age and education level, the household’s wealth measured 
by the size of land owned, the household’s ethnicity, and the indicator variables of whether they 
belong to service caste (kammee), whether the marriage is endogamous, and whether the 
marriage is watta satta. The village fixed effects, 𝑣𝑖, are controlled. The outcome variable, 𝑌𝑖𝑖, 
is one of those measuring women’s status in the marital household, described in subsection 3.3.  
Because the dowry amount is presumably endogenous, we address the endogeneity 
problem in two ways. First, we follow the procedure developed by Altonji et al. (2005) to 
indicate how large the effects of unobservables should be in order to remove the effects of 
dowry. Second, we treat endogeneity using a set of instruments. In the literature, the “- 𝑖 
method” is used to construct an instrument if no instrument exists (Aizer 2010; Vogl 2013). The 
basic idea is to develop an instrument that reflects the marriage market, excluding the own 
household unobservables by construction. In Punjab, Pakistan, the marriage market is defined 
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within relatives rather than within the village. Thus, the current study utilizes as instruments (1) 
the brothers’ average amount of dowry paid by the brothers’ in-laws and (2) the sisters’ average 
amount of bari paid by the sisters’ in-laws. The first stage equation is given by 
 
𝐷𝚤𝚤� = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐷𝚤𝑏𝑏𝚤������ + 𝜶𝟐
′ 𝒁𝒊𝒊 + 𝜶𝟑′ 𝑿𝒊𝒊 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑖, (2) 
 
where 𝐷𝚤𝑏𝑏𝚤������ is the average amount of the wife’s brothers’ dowries paid by the brothers’ in-laws. 
𝒁𝒊𝒊 includes other excluded variables, i.e., the wife’s natal family income at the time of her 
marriage and the assets owned by the wife’s natal family at the time of her marriage; 𝑿𝒊𝒊 and 
𝑣𝑖  are the same as in equation (1). Because of the prevalence of endogamy and strong 
assortative mating in rural Pakistani marriage, the average dowries that the wife’s brothers’ 
in-laws paid are presumably positively associated with the dowry amount that the wife 
personally received from her parents; however, we assume that they do not affect the wife’s 
status in her marital household. The endogeneity of the wife’s bari offered by in-laws is 
similarly treated, simply replacing 𝐷𝚤𝚤�  and 𝐷𝚤𝑏𝑏𝚤������ in equation (2) with 𝐵𝚤𝚤�  and 𝐵𝚤𝑠𝑠𝑠𝚤������ (the 
average amount of the wife’s sisters’ bari paid by sisters’ in-laws), respectively. Also, we 
assume that the wife’s natal family’s income and assets owned at the time of her marriage affect 
the wife’s status in her marital household only through her dowry brought into marriage. This 
seems a plausible assumption, given that transfer from the wife’s natal family to the husband’s 
family after marriage is negligible, at least in our sample. However, we do not ignore the 
possibility that the wife’s natal family’s status, usually represented by the assets owned, affects 
how she is treated in the marital family. Because of this concern, we check whether the 2SLS 
estimation results substantially change by dropping her natal family’s assets at the time of her 
marriage; we confirm that they do not.  
The estimation results of the first stage regression are shown in Table 2. As expected, the 
average amount of dowries that the wife’s brothers’ in-laws paid is strongly associated with the 
wife’s own dowry paid by her parents. Likewise, the average amount of the wife’s sisters’ bari 
is strongly associated with the wife’s own bari paid by her in-laws. When the wife’s natal 
family has plenty of cash at the time of her marriage controlling for assets, the amount of dowry 
increases. Overall, results support assortative mating, which is reflected in the positive sign of 
the husband’s education on the wife’s own bari, and positive signs of the wife’s education on 
both. Also, the results seem to reflect the fact that marriage expenses, such as dowry and bari, 
depend simply on families’ available resources; this is reflected in the negative sign of lower 
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caste and the positive sign of size of agricultural land on the wife’s own bari.19 
 
4.2 Main results  
The estimated effects of dowry and bari on the wife’s decision-making power by linear 
probability model (LPM) are presented in Table 3. To maintain comparability with the 2SLS 
estimation, the sample includes only those who have at least one brother and one sister. The 
LPM estimates are not substantially different when using the full sample. The estimates show a 
significantly positive effect of the dowry amount on the wife’s decision making on purchases of 
expensive items and children’s marriages. One standard deviation above the mean of dowry (i.e., 
16.49) increases the probability of the wife having decision-making power on the purchase of 
expensive items and on children’s marriages by 8 and 11 percentage points, respectively; these 
are large, given that the percentages of wives who have the most say on the purchase of 
expensive items and on children’s marriages are only 18 and 26, respectively. However, the 
amount of bari that the wife received from her in-laws significantly decreases her 
decision-making power on the number of children. As expected, higher education of the wife is 
associated with her higher decision-making power on three out of five decision-making matters, 
while the significantly negative effects of literacy are unexpected. A negative sign of the wife’s 
literacy might simply capture the fact that lower-caste wives are less oppressed than upper-caste 
wives and act relatively independently of their husbands in South Asia (Chacraborty and Kim 
2010; Bidner and Eswaran 2015). Interestingly, endogamy, both marriage within the same 
village and marriage between cousins, is significantly associated with lower decision-making 
power of the wife.20  
Following Altonji et al. (2005), we check how large the effects of unobservables should be 
in order to completely eliminate the dowry’s effects. Table 4 shows the LPM estimates without 
a set of observable covariates. In decision making on purchases of expensive items and 
children’s marriages, dowry effects magnify with inclusion of a set of observables. In decision 
making on fertility, dowry effects decrease by only 1.2 percentage points. These estimates 
                                                        
19 Although it is not the interest of this paper, the results do not seem consistent with the price 
model, as reflected by insignificant effects of wife’s age at marriage, husband’s education, and 
husband’s family’s status on the wife’s own dowry. Note that the results do not seem to be 
compatible with the bequest model or the circulating dowry hypothesis either. We check the first 
stage including the number of wife’s sisters and brothers. Both of them are insignificant on the 
wife’s own dowry; this is not in accordance with the bequest as well as the circulating hypothesis of 
dowry.  
20 Although the current study is not about the relation between the endogamy and women’s status in 
the marital household, the estimation results do not support the classical Dyson and Moore (1983) 
hypothesis that endogamy explains a relatively higher status of women in the southern part of India 
than in the northern.  
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imply that the effects of unobservables should be at least 2.6 times larger than those of 
observables; this is unlikely given that the observables are exhaustive, ranging from the 
household’s demographic and socioeconomic characteristics to the village fixed effects.  
We estimate equation (1) by replacing 𝐷𝑖𝑖 (𝐵𝑖𝑖) with 𝐷𝚤𝚤�  (𝐵𝚤𝚤� ) generated by equation (2), 
and the 2SLS estimation results are presented in Table 5. The score test of overidentifying 
restrictions cannot reject the null hypothesis that a set of instruments is valid. The results are not 
substantially different from those shown in Table 3. The magnitudes of the coefficients of 
interest (those of dowry) are slightly greater than the LPM estimates. Now, the amount of bari 
has a significantly negative effect on the wife’s decision making about the purchase of 
expensive items and not on the number of children; however, it does not affect the main 
implication suggested by Table 3. That is, a larger dowry is positively associated with the wife’s 
greater decision-making power, and a larger bari (or bride price) is negatively associated with 
her decision-making power. The estimates of other coefficients are very similar to those shown 
in Table 3.  
We repeat the estimation in Table 5 by replacing the measure of the wife’s 
decision-making power with other measures presumably reflecting her status in the marital 
household, explained in subsection 3.3.21 Two of them are indicator variables: one is the 
measure of the wife’s autonomy, taking the value one when the wife needs permission of her 
husband to go to the local clinic; another is the measure of her son preference, taking the value 
one when she thinks sons should be educated more than daughters. The remaining two are the 
wife’s work time only for pay and only for household chores, respectively. The 2SLS estimates 
are shown in Table 6. Overall, these estimates support the view that a higher amount of dowry is 
associated with higher women’s status, and a higher amount of bari is associated with lower 
women’s status. All the coefficient estimates of dowry, except for work time for pay, are 
significantly negative, implying that the greater the dowry, the less likely the wife is to obey her 
husband, to have son preference, and to spend time in household chores. The coefficient 
estimate of bari on the wife’s time for household chores is positive, meaning that when the wife 
receives a greater bride price from her in-laws, she spends more time on household chores. The 
magnitude of these coefficient estimates is not negligible. One standard deviation above the 
mean of dowry decreases the probability that the wife needs permission from her husband to go 
to the local clinic by 12 percentage points. Also, one standard deviation above the mean of 
dowry decreases her time for household chores by 30 minutes per day. Other coefficient 
estimates are also in accordance with our expectations. Higher education of wives is associated 
                                                        
21 Only the measures on which the amount of dowry has significant effects are shown here. 
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with less son preference in education and more working hours for pay. A positive effect of 
watta satta marriage on the wife’s lack of autonomy could also be claimed as expected. It is not 
difficult to imagine that women in watta satta marriage are restricted in their behavior because 
of its reciprocal or even retaliatory nature.22  
 
4.3 Robustness checks  
One might argue that positive effects of dowry simply reflect affluence of households, and 
women in more affluent families are usually better treated and thus more empowered. However, 
if this argument makes sense, the effect of bari should be stronger and significant because it 
directly reflects the wealth of the groom’s household and thus the marital household. Overall, a 
higher amount of dowry seems to enhance women’s status, controlling for household wealth. 
The possibility of other explanations is checked by replacing some of the explanatory 
variables with alternatives. Because of arranged marriage, positive assortative mating, 
especially similarity of socioeconomic status between the bride and the groom, is strongly 
maintained in rural Pakistan. However, age difference seems not to pose any difficulty as long 
as the groom is older than the bride. Possibly, a greater age or education difference might 
weaken the wife’s status in the marital household. Including age difference, as well as education 
difference (replacing the husband’s age and education), does not affect the main outcomes, and 
the coefficients of these variables are not significant.  
One might argue that years since marriage are important because the effect of dowry (or 
bride price) might be greater soon after marriage. Including years since marriage and its 
interaction term with the amount of dowry (replacing woman’s age at marriage) does not alter 
the main estimation results concerning dowry. Interestingly, the base effects of bride price now 
have significantly negative effects on the wife’s decision-making power on children’s marriages 
and treatment of a sick child, although coefficients of the interaction term are insignificant. This 
implies that a greater bride price lessens the wife’s decision-making power in the marital 
household immediately after marriage; however, the effect becomes smaller with passage of 
years since marriage.  
Muslim marriage officially requires mehr (bride price), but not dowry, and its amount 
might also affect women’s status in the marital household. A significant amount of mehr is 
non-moajel, which means that payment is deferred, or never happens, unless divorce occurs. 
Because the amount of mehr is written into the marriage contract and is binding, it might 
enhance women’s status in the marital household because their husbands cannot obtain a 
                                                        
22 Jacoby and Mansuri (2010) focus on the retaliatory nature of watta satta arrangement and show 
that it averts more marital strife.  
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no-fault divorce without incurring substantial costs corresponding to the amount of mehr.23 
However, as discussed in subsection 3.2, mehr becomes a mere token payment in rural Pakistan, 
and therefore, it might not be a matter of importance in determining the wife’s status. Only 15 
percent of wives in the sample respond that a positive amount of mehr was written into the 
marriage contract. As predicted, inclusion of mehr does not affect the main estimation results, 
and its coefficient shows no statistical significance.24  
 
5. Conclusion 
Dowry has been demonized as a root cause of women’s unfavorable treatment in South 
Asian countries and is universally banned or restricted there, despite little empirical evidence of 
its evil. We should not blame dowry alone on the basis of mere anecdotal evidence, as if it were 
the cause of all domestic homicides in South Asia. The fact that the Dowry Prohibition Act is 
completely ineffective across regions suggests that there exist good reasons for continuing the 
practice of dowry. If dowry has such a negative or even detrimental effect on women’s welfare, 
why would people not relinquish dowry, given that most parents have daughters? It seems more 
natural to admit that people recognize positive aspects of dowry and thus maintain its practice in 
a given context.  
We cannot find any negative effects of dowry on women’s welfare. Rather, the estimation 
results consistently show that a higher amount of dowry increases women’s status in the marital 
household in rural Punjab, Pakistan. The effect seems to be robust with respect to measures of 
women’s status, ranging from decision-making power to time spent on household chores. After 
carefully examining the data, the dowry seems, in fact, a trousseau the parents offer their 
daughter, expecting that she will then have a better life in the marital household.  
Given this empirical evidence, should we keep the practice of dowry without reservation? 
Not necessarily. On one hand, it is plausible that banning or restricting dowry might work 
against women’s interest, given the current circumstances that in actual practice, women do not 
have inheritance rights. On the other hand, if women are provided property rights equal to those 
of their brothers, dowry might not only be useless, but also harmful to women—as is now 
widely claimed. Phenomena concerning dowry practice can be a manifestation of a coordination 
failure in the society as a whole, as in the case of exchange marriage suggested by Jacoby and 
Mansuri (2010). Because most families are bride givers as well as bride recipients, if there is an 
effective way to commit not to give and receive dowry, all families might be better off.  
Besides, the effects of dowry might vary across the regions of South Asia. The evidence in 
                                                        
23 For the expected functions of mehr to protect women, see Ambrus et al. (2010). 
24 The estimation results of these robustness checks are available upon request.  
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this study does not necessarily assure positive effects of dowry in urban areas or more 
modernized societies in South Asia. Furthermore, we cannot deny the possibility that the effects 
of dowry, in the near future, might become negative in rural Pakistan. The empirical evidence of 
this study alerts against simply claiming dowry as an evil practice and ignoring the environment 
in which women currently live. In other words, an outright ban on dowry is not necessarily a 
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Figure 1: Relationship between women’s years of marriage and real dowry amounts 
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Figure 2: The relationship between the woman’s year of marriage and the real amount of dowry 
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Figure 4: Mean value of items included in dowry (PKR) 
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Figure 5: Average expenses incurred in marriage (PKR) 
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Figure 7: Measures of women’s status and empowerment 
 
  








































(a) Woman has the most say in deciding...


























(b) Woman has to ask permision of her husband to go to...
















(c) Son preference of women






























Table 1: Summary statistics   
Husband’s age 40.63 
 (11.35) 
Husband’s education 3.16 
 (1.91) 
Husband’s literacy 0.557 
 (0.497) 
Kammee(= service caste; yes= 1) 0.266 
 (0.442) 
Size of agricultural land (acre)  3.24 
 (6.33) 
Wife’s age 35.76 
 (10.45) 
Wife’s education 2.18 
 (1.77) 
Wife’s literacy 0.299 
 (0.458) 
Wife’s age at marriage 19.99 
 (4.07) 
Village endogamy (yes= 1) 0.39 
 (0.49) 
Cousin marriage (yes= 1) 0.657 
 (0.475) 
Watta satta (= exchange marriage; yes= 1) 0.175 
 (0.380) 
Dowry (PKR in 2013) 158011  
 (164876) 
Bari (= bride price, PKR in 2013) 73816  
 (85229) 
Observations 659 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The variable 
"education" takes discrete values: = 1 if no education, = 2 if 
below primary, = 3 if primary completed (5 years), = 4 if middle 
completed (8 years) , = 5 if matric completed (10 years), = 6 if 
intermediate completed (12 years), = 7 if degree or post graduate. 
Household-level variables such as kammee and size of 






Table 2: First stage regression     
 (1) (2) 
  Dowry (PKR 10,000 in 2013) 
Bari (PKR 10,000 
in 2013) 




Wife’s sisters’ bari (= bride price, average PKR 
10,000 in 2013) 
0.381*** 0.426*** 
(0.115) (0.108) 
Wife’s natal family’s income at the time of 
marriage (PKR 10,000 in 2013) 
0.492** 0.100 
(0.180) (0.0802) 
Wife’s natal family’s asset (acre) -0.157 -0.482* 
 (0.670) (0.254) 
Husband’s age 0.0986 0.00992 
 (0.100) (0.0851) 
Husband’s education 0.0677 0.735** 
 (0.434) (0.309) 
Husband’s literacy 0.704 -1.347 
 (1.051) (1.073) 
Kammee(= service caste; yes= 1) -1.809 -1.585** 
 (1.357) (0.718) 
Size of agricultural land (acre)  -0.00449 0.196** 
 (0.203) (0.0899) 
Wife’s age -0.0955 0.00908 
 (0.127) (0.0985) 
Wife’s education 0.948* 0.929* 
 (0.549) (0.468) 
Wife’s literacy 1.438 -2.638 
 (1.815) (1.717) 
Wife’s age at marriage 0.428 -0.0321 
 (0.278) (0.166) 
Village endogamy (yes= 1) 1.645 0.890 
 (1.419) (0.535) 
Cousin marriage (yes= 1) -0.917 -0.689 
 (1.012) (0.727) 
Watta satta (= exchange marriage; yes= 1) 0.0201 0.598 
 (1.334) (0.602) 
Constant 4.757 3.131 
 (8.987) (5.013) 
 
  Observations 436 436 
R-squared 0.677 0.480 
Note: Cluster(village)-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The village fixed effects and 
ethnicity are controlled. *** significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.  
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Table 3: Effects of dowry on wife’s decision making (LPM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










Dowry (PKR 10,000 in 
2013) 
0.0015 0.0046** 0.0031 -0.0006 0.0064** 
(0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0023) 
Bari (=bride price, PKR 
10,000 in 2013) 
0.0004 -0.0034 -0.0081** -0.0035 -0.0037 
(0.0045) (0.0038) (0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0026) 
Husband’s age 0.0000 0.0032 -0.0084 0.0026 -0.0057 
 (0.0057) (0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0053) (0.0054) 
Husband’s education 0.0147 -0.0104 -0.0187 -0.0121 -0.0020 
 (0.0205) (0.0210) (0.0239) (0.0219) (0.0194) 
Husband’s literacy -0.1130 -0.0697 0.0600 0.0190 -0.0163 
 (0.0743) (0.0735) (0.0838) (0.0670) (0.0665) 
Kammee(= service 
caste; yes= 1) 
-0.0516 0.0667 -0.0106 -0.0951 -0.0493 
(0.0646) (0.0530) (0.0593) (0.0642) (0.0644) 
Size of agricultural land 
(acre)  
-0.0004 0.0020 0.0018 0.0041 0.0001 
(0.0030) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0042) 
Wife’s age -0.001 -0.0023 0.0059 0.0007 0.0036 
 (0.0061) (0.0043) (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0060) 
Wife’s education -0.0064 0.0750*** 0.0966*** 0.0208 0.0483* 
 (0.0239) (0.0260) (0.0270) (0.0278) (0.0246) 
Wife’s literacy -0.185* -0.154 -0.283** -0.135 -0.308*** 
 (0.0956) (0.0914) (0.108) (0.110) (0.0931) 
Wife’s age at marriage -0.0018 -0.0122 0.0024 -0.0078 -0.0063 
 (0.0061) (0.0072) (0.0059) (0.0065) (0.0063) 
Village endogamy (yes= 
1) 
-0.109** -0.0431 -0.0833* -0.0329 -0.111* 
(0.0499) (0.0457) (0.0431) (0.0610) (0.0561) 
Cousin marriage (yes= 
1) 
-0.0889 -0.0610 -0.125** -0.0975** -0.133*** 
-0.0524 (0.0378) (0.0587) (0.0444) (0.0298) 
Watta satta (= exchange 
marriage; yes= 1) 
0.0481 -0.0121 0.0393 0.0096 0.0732 
(0.0665) (0.0419) (0.0653) (0.0668) (0.0688) 
Constant 1.088*** 0.382** 0.568*** 1.091*** 0.474** 
 (0.132) (0.185) (0.171) (0.159) (0.185) 
 
     Observations 436 436 436 436 436 
R-squared 0.211 0.196 0.267 0.259 0.272 
Note: Cluster(village)-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The village fixed effects and 
ethnicity are controlled. The sample excludes those who have no brother and no sister. 
Dependent variables are all indicator variables taking one when the wife has the most say on 





Table 4: Effects of dowry on wife’s decision making without observables (LPM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










Dowry (PKR 10,000 in 
2013) 
0.0002 0.0037** 0.0043** 0.0006 0.0062** 
(0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0026) 
Bari (=bride price, 
PKR 10,000 in 2013) 
-0.0003 -0.0025 -0.0053 -0.0011 -0.0055* 
(0.0044) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0031) 
Constant 0.759*** 0.151*** 0.262*** 0.628*** 0.229*** 
 (0.0339) (0.0334) (0.0451) (0.0546) (0.0485) 
 
     Observations 437 437 437 437 437 
R-squared 0.000 0.015 0.014 0.000 0.030 
Note: Cluster(village)-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The sample excludes those who 
have no brother and no sister. Dependent variables are all indicator variables taking one when 
the wife has the most say on each decision-making matter. *** significant at 1% level, ** at 5% 





Table 5: Effects of dowry on wife’s decision making (2SLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 








of sick child 
Children’s 
marriage 
Dowry (PKR 10,000 in 
2013) 
-0.0005 0.0095*** 0.0044 -0.0007 0.0080** 
(0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0035) 
Bari (=bride price, PKR 
10,000 in 2013) 
0.0049 -0.0186*** -0.0092 -0.0090 -0.0066 
(0.0075) (0.0058) (0.0093) (0.0081) (0.0084) 
Husband’s age 0.0001 0.0031 -0.0086* 0.0030 -0.0058 
 (0.0054) (0.0040) (0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0050) 
Husband’s education 0.0133 -0.0047 -0.0189 -0.0086 -0.0014 
 (0.0183) (0.0196) (0.0223) (0.0208) (0.0178) 
Husband’s literacy -0.109 -0.0825 0.0580 0.0168 -0.0196 
 (0.0699) (0.0663) (0.0800) (0.0593) (0.0609) 
Kammee(= service caste; 
yes= 1) 
-0.0504 0.0578 -0.0087 -0.104* -0.0491 
(0.0583) (0.0480) (0.0556) (0.0593) (0.0593) 
Size of agricultural land 
(acre)  
-0.0002 0.0030 0.0011 0.0064 -0.0003 
(0.0029) (0.0042) (0.0035) (0.0051) (0.0049) 
Wife’s age -0.001 -0.0026 0.0061 0.0002 0.0037 
 (0.0058) (0.0040) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0056) 
Wife’s education -0.0095 0.0869*** 0.0967*** 0.0269 0.0500** 
 (0.0232) (0.0220) (0.0247) (0.0258) (0.0220) 
Wife’s literacy -0.167* -0.209*** -0.290*** -0.150 -0.320*** 
 (0.0947) (0.0813) (0.0938) (0.101) (0.0796) 
Wife’s age at marriage -0.001 -0.0137** 0.0017 -0.0070 -0.0070 
 (0.0058) (0.0065) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0065) 
Village endogamy (yes= 1) -0.109** -0.0402 -0.0845** -0.0286 -0.111** 
 (0.0450) (0.0428) (0.0407) (0.0582) (0.0539) 
Cousin marriage (yes= 1) -0.0906* -0.0556 -0.124** -0.0960** -0.132*** 
 (0.0484) (0.0372) (0.0543) (0.0410) (0.0284) 
Watta satta (= exchange 
marriage; yes= 1) 
0.0465 -0.0061 0.0393 0.0127 0.0740 
(0.0624) (0.0374) (0.0604) (0.0621) (0.0632) 
Constant 1.085*** 0.409** 0.562*** 1.119*** 0.473*** 
 (0.127) (0.186) (0.162) (0.143) (0.180) 
 
     Observations 436 436 436 436 436 




















(0.520) 3.76 (0.152) 
3.78 
(0.151) 
Note: Cluster(village)-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The village fixed effects and 
ethnicity are controlled. *** significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.  
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Table 6: Effects of dowry on wife’s status: autonomy, level of son preference, time allocation (2SLS) 

















Dowry (PKR 10,000 in 2013) -0.0074** -0.0069** 0.0030 -0.0307*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0112) (0.0109) 
Bari (=bride price, PKR 10,000 in 2013) 0.0090 0.0047 -0.0333* 0.0987*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0065) (0.0193) (0.0265) 
Husband’s age -0.0019 0.0054 -0.0016 0.0113 
 (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0102) (0.0178) 
Husband’s education -0.0026 -0.0318 0.151*** -0.0308 
 (0.0237) (0.0212) (0.0550) (0.0828) 
Husband’s literacy 0.0522 0.0594 -0.557*** 0.226 
 (0.0738) (0.0752) (0.165) (0.287) 
Kammee(= service caste; yes= 1) -0.0300 0.0683 0.550*** 0.0960 
 (0.0480) (0.0581) (0.161) (0.233) 
Size of agricultural land (acre)  0.0060 0.0012 0.0008 0.0077 
 (0.0045) (0.0038) (0.0095) (0.0190) 
Wife’s age -0.0024 -0.0023 0.003 -0.0759*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0048) (0.0120) (0.0176) 
Wife’s education -0.0048 -0.0410* 0.379*** -0.102 
 (0.0210) (0.0221) (0.110) (0.0933) 
Wife’s literacy 0.0978 0.0755 -0.833*** 0.342 
 (0.0852) (0.0907) (0.289) (0.355) 
Wife’s age at marriage 0.0079 -0.0004 -0.0128 0.0395** 
 (0.0051) (0.0065) (0.0149) (0.0171) 
Village endogamy (yes= 1) 0.0695 -0.0194 0.0518 -0.142 
 (0.0532) (0.0634) (0.101) (0.145) 
Cousin marriage (yes= 1) 0.0448 0.0515 -0.0960 0.0687 
 (0.0383) (0.0478) (0.147) (0.169) 
Watta satta (= exchange marriage; yes= 1) 0.0894* -0.0313 0.204* -0.246 
 (0.0471) (0.0648) (0.123) (0.164) 
Constant 0.133 0.527*** -0.202 6.749*** 
 (0.150) (0.195) (0.438) (0.586) 
 
    Observations 436 436 434 434 








6.54     
(0.005) 








0.668    
(0.716) 
Note: Cluster(village)-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The village fixed effects and 
ethnicity are controlled. *** significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.  
 
